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INHERENT POWERS AND SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS:
LIMITING FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT JURISDICTION
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America
114 S. Ct. 1673 (1994)
Bradley S. Clanton
I. INTRODUCTION
At a time when the rising costs of legal services' and other factors force almost
ninety-five percent of all private civil cases in federal court to settle before trial,2
settlement agreements abound. However, because these settlement agreements
are contractual, an increasing number are breached and enforcement is sought by
the injured party. As a result, many federal courts have used their "inherent
powers" to enforce agreements settling cases previously pending before them,
even where no independent basis for federal jurisdiction exists. The Supreme
Court addressed this issue in Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of
America.'
II. FACTS
A. The District Court
Matt T. Kokkonen, owner of the Matt Kokkonen Insurance Agency, filed suit on
April 6, 1990, in the California Superior Court for the County of Tulare against
Guardian Life Insurance Company of America [hereinafter Guardian] and other
Guardian subsidiaries alleging various state law claims resulting from the termi-
nation of agency agreements and his employment relationship with Guardian. 4
Guardian timely removed the case to the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of California under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441, raising counter-
claims against Kokkonen for wrongful conduct occurring after termination of the
agreements.' After discovery and a three-day jury trial, but before the jury was
instructed, the parties reached a settlement agreement. 6 The parties then met with
I. See William G. Ross, The Ethics of Hourly Billing by Attorneys, 44 RutTGERs L. REV. 1, 90 (1991); Allison
F. Aranson, Note, The United States Percentage Contingent Fee System: Ridicule and Reform from an International
Perspective, 27 TEX. INT'L L.J. 755, 782 n. 186 (1992).
2. See Steven P. Croley, What Liability Crisis? An Alternative Explanation for Recent Events in Products
Liability, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 111 n.98 (1991) (citing Ellen J. Pollock & Edward Felsenthal, Private Civil Cases
in Federal Courts Rarely Reach Trial, WALL ST. J., June 27, 1990, at B6).
3. 114 S. Ct. 1673 (1994).
4. Brief on the Merits of Petitioner at 4, Kokkonen (No. 93-263); Brief for Respondents at 3, Kokkonen
(No. 93-263).
5. Brief on the Merits of Petitioner at 4, Kokkonen (No. 93-263); Brief for Respondents at 3, Kokkonen
(No. 93-263).
6. Kokkonen, 114 S. Ct. at 1674-75.
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the district judge in his chambers and recited the agreement on the record.7 In
April, 1992, a Stipulation and Order of Dismissal With Prejudice was executed
and presented to the court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41(a)(1)(ii), 8 and was signed by the judge and marked "It is so ordered."9 In the
Stipulation and Order the court did not attempt to retain jurisdiction to enforce the
settlement agreement, nor did the order contain any reference to the agreement. 0
A disagreement ensued regarding Kokkonen's obligation to return certain files,
and Guardian moved on May 21 in the district court for enforcement of the agree-
ment. 1 Kokkonen challenged the court's subject matter jurisdiction, but the court
asserted that it had the "inherent power" to enforce the settlement agreement. 2
The court then entered an order requiring Kokkonen to fully comply with the
terms of the agreement and to pay all costs and attorney fees sustained by Guard-
ian in bringing the motion to enforce. 3 Kokkonen then appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on the issue of subject matter juris-
diction. 4
B. The Court of Appeals
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's enforcement of the settlement
agreement in an unreported opinion.'" Citing Wilkinson v. FBP' and Dacanay v.
Mendoza,'" the court held that "a district court has the 'inherent power summarily
to enforce a settlement agreement with respect to an action pending before it.' "8
The court said that" '[t]he authority of a trial court to enter a judgment enforcing
a settlement agreement has as its foundation the policy favoring the amicable
7. Id.
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1) states:
[A]n action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing a notice of dismissal at
any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment, which-
ever first occurs, or (ii) by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the
action. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is without preju-
dice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff
who has once dismissed in any court of the United States or of any state an action based on or including
the same claim.
9. Kokkonen, 114 S. Ct. at 1675.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. Even though Kokkonen and Guardian were still diverse, the amount involved in the enforcement
motion was less than the amount necessary for diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Brief on the Merits
of Petitioner at 7 n. 10, Kokkonen (No. 93-263).
13. Brief on the Merits of Petitioner at 7, Kokkonen (No. 93-263); Brief for Respondents at 6, Kokkonen
(No. 93-263).
14. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 114 S. Ct. 1673, 1675 (1994).
15. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 993 F.2d 883 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 341
(1993), andrev'd, 114 S. Ct. 1673 (1994).
16. 922 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1991).
17. 573 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1978).
18. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 92-16628, 1993 WL 164884, at *1 (9th Cir. May 18,




adjustment of disputes and the concomitant avoidance of costly and time
consuming litigation.' "19
III. HISTORY
A. Inherent Powers Generally
In Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America, Justice Scalia, writ-
ing for a unanimous Court, grouped the inherent powers doctrine under the gen-
eral heading of "ancillary jurisdiction," which he said encompassed two distinct
powers: the power to "permit disposition by a single court of claims that are, in
varying respects and degrees, factually interdependent," and the power to "enable
a court to function successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings, vindicate its
authority, and effectuate its decrees."21 The power to entertain factually interde-
pendent claims is commonly referred to as "ancillary jurisdiction"22 and has been,
to some extent, codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1367.23 However, since the factual basis of
19. Kokkonen, 1993 WL 164884, at *1 (quoting Dacanay, 573 F2d at 1078).
20. 114 S. Ct. 1673 (1994).
21. Id. at 1676.
22. See, e.g., Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 417 U.S. 467,469 n. 1 (1974) (superseded by statute) (com-
pulsory counterclaims are ancillary to the main claim); Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 609
(1926) (allowing counterclaims "arising out of the transaction which is the subject matter of the suit"). See gener-
ally 32A AM. JUR. 2D Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 1246-1260 (1982); 36 C.J.S. Federal Courts § 13
(1960); 1 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.67 (2d ed. 1994); 2 JOHN J. PALMER, CYCLO-
PEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE §§ 2.417-2.433 (3d ed. 1987); CHARLES A. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS §
9 (4th ed. 1983); 13 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3523
(1984); Richard A. Matasar, A Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction Primer: The Scope and Limits of Supplemental
Jurisdiction, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 103 (1983); Susan M. Glenn, Note, Federal Supplemental Enforcement Juris-
diction, 42 S.C. L. REV. 469 (1991).
23.28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp. V 1993) provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute,
in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have sup-
plemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related toclaims in the action within such original
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Con-
stitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of
additional parties.
(b) In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded solely on section
1332 of this title, the district courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a) over
claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, or over claims by persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules,
or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when exercising supplemental jurisdic-
tion over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.
(c) The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection
(a) if-
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has
original jurisdiction,
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.
(d) The period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a), and for any other claim in the
same action that is voluntarily dismissed at the same time as or after the dismissal of the claim under sub-
section (a), shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless
State law provides for a longer tolling period.
(e) As used in this section, the term "State" includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the United States.
See also FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.28 (4th ed. 1992).
1995]
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a breach of a settlement agreement will rarely be similar to the factual basis of the
original claim, as was the case in Kokkonen, that type of ancillary jurisdiction is
outside the scope of this discussion.
Enforcement of settlement agreements involves what Justice Scalia described
as the second type of ancillary jurisdiction, namely "to enable a court to function
successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effec-
tuate its decrees."24 Federal courts have long been recognized as having powers
which are inherent or necessary for their institutional existence.25 As early as 1812
the Supreme Court recognized the necessity of implied powers in the federal
courts:
Certain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the
nature of their institution. . . . To fine for contempt -imprison for contumacy -
inforce [sic] the observance of order, &c. are powers which cannot be dispensed
with in a Court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others: and so far
our Courts no doubt possess powers not immediately derived from statute ... 26
Such inherent or implied powers have been held to include the power of a court to
suspend attorneys from practice before it "for the preservation of decorum, and for
the respectability of the profession;"27 to punish contempt;28 to disbar attorneys
from practice in that court; 29 to exert power" 'over [its] own process, to prevent
abuses, oppression, and injustice;' "" and to" 'protect [its] own jurisdiction and
officers in the possession of property that is in the custody of the law.' "31 Federal
courts have also been held to have power to investigate and determine whether a
judgment was obtained by fraud, and to assess attorney's fees as part of the taxable
costs of such a proceeding;32 to dismiss actions sua sponte for lack of prosecu-
tion;33 to bind and gag unruly criminal defendants, hold them in contempt, or
remove them from the courtroom;34 and in courts of appeals, to make decisions
upon petitions for bills of review, even after the term of the challenged judgment
has expired.35
24. Kokkonen, 114 S. Ct. at 1676.
25. See generally 1 MOORE, supra note 22, 0.60[6].
26. United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812).
27. Exparte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 531 (1824).
28. Exparte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510(1873). See also Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et
Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 793 (1987) (holding that courts have inherent power to "initiate contempt proceedings
for disobedience to their orders," and to appoint a private attorney to prosecute the contempt).
29. Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) at 510.
30. Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 U.S. 131, 144 (1888) (quoting Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U.S. 276,283 (1883)).
31. Id. (quoting Krippendorf, 110 U.S. at 283). See also Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Hozier, 267 U.S. 276, 280
(1925) (finding claim ancillary where "it has direct relation to property or assets actually or constructively drawn
into the court's possession or control by the principal suit").
32. Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Root Ref. Co., 328 U.S. 575,580 (1946).
33. Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630 (1962). Such power resulted from the" 'inherent power'.
vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases." Id.
at 630-31.
34. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970).
35. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 248-49 (1944).
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More recent decisions involve sanctions of attorneys for bad faith conduct dur-
ing litigation. 6 In Chambers v. NASCO, 37 the Supreme Court held that sanctions
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 did not displace the inherent power of
federal courts to impose attorney's fees as sanctions for bad faith conduct8 The
Chambers Court, citing United States v. Hudson,39 reaffirmed the inherent powers
doctrine and many of the previously cited cases, noting that" '[c]ertain implied
powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature of their
institution,' powers 'which cannot be dispensed with in a Court, because they are
necessary to the exercise of all others.' "40 The Court then stated that "[f]or this
reason, 'Courts ofjustice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very
creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence,
and submission to their lawful mandates;' "41 and that "[t]hese powers are 'gov-
erned not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to man-
age their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of
cases.' "42
B. Inherent Power to Enforce Settlement Agreements
Many courts have recognized the inherent power to enforce settlement agree-
ments reached in suits previously pending before them.43 One of the most widely
cited cases for the proposition is Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co. 44 Aro sued Allied
for patent infringement, and Allied counterclaimed alleging unfair competition
and antitrust violations. 4' The parties subsequently reached an agreement to set-
tle, and the claim was dismissed without prejudice.4 Six months later, Aro made a
motion to vacate the order of dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60,
due to an alleged breach of the settlement agreement by Allied. 47 The district court
granted the motion, reinstated the case to the docket, and enjoined Allied from not
complying with the terms of the agreement. 48 The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding
36. See, e.g., Willy v. Coastal Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1076, 1080 (1992) (upholding Rule 11 sanctions even after
subject matter jurisdiction no longer existed); Chambers v. NASCO, 501 U.S. 32, 51 (1991) (holding that Rule
II did not displace inherent power to award attorney's fees for bad faith conduct); Roadway Express, Inc. v.
Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766 (1980) (superseded by statute) (awarding attorney's fees for "bad faith" conduct).
37. 501 U.S. 32 (1991).
38.Id. at51.
39. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
40. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43 (quoting Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 34) (alteration in original).
41. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821)).
42. Id. (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962)).
43. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. FBI, 922 F.2d 555, 557 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Baus, 834 F.2d 1114,
1127 (1st Cir. 1987); Mathewson Corp. v. Allied Marine Indus., Inc., 827 F.2d 850, 852 (1st Cir. 1987); Joy
Mfg. Co. v. National Mine Serv. Co., 810 F.2d 1127, 1129 (Fed. Cir. 1987); TNT Mktg., Inc. v. Agresti, 796
F.2d 276, 278 (9th Cir. 1986); Dankese v. Defense Logistics Agency, 693 F.2d 13, 16 (Ist Cir. 1982); Dacanay
v. Mendoza, 573 F.2d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 1978); Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368, 1371 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976).
44. 531 F.2d 1368 (6th Cir.), ceit. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976).
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that "[i]t is well established that courts retain the inherent power to enforce agree-
ments entered into in settlement of litigation pending before them."49 The court
cited All States Investors, Inc. v. Bankers Bond Co. " for the proposition that" '[a]
compromise or settlement of litigation is always referable to the action or proceed-
ing in the court where the compromise was effective; it is through that court the
carrying out of the agreement should thereafter be controlled.' "51 The court stated
that where a party attempts to repudiate an agreement which led to the dismissal, a
district court may relieve the aggrieved party from the final judgment under Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). 2 Once the case was reinstated, the court of
appeals said "[t]he court below had not only the inherent power but, when
required in the interests of justice, the duty to enforce the agreement which had
settled the dispute pending before it." 3 The court reasoned that settlement agree-
ments were more than just ordinary contracts, in that they come "into existence
not in the free market place but in response to pending litigation in a federal court"
and thus "cannot be viewed independently of the original suit." 4 This fact, coup-
led with the fact that "[p]ublic policy strongly favors settlement of disputes without
litigation,"55 was sufficient justification to allow the district court to enforce the
agreement. "
A more recent case recognizing this inherent power is United States v. Baus. 7 In
Baus, a settlement agreement between a government agency and the guarantors of
a loan was allegedly breached by the government .59 The guarantors moved under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) to vacate the judgment, but the motion
was denied due to untimeliness and failure to set forth sufficient facts to justify the
delay.59 The First Circuit reversed, holding that breach of a settlement agreement
was sufficient justification for relief ofjudgment under Rule 60(b)(6),6 and that if
the facts alleged by the guarantor were true, the motion was timely made.6 The
court then noted that "[s]hould the district court vacate the judgment on account of
material breach, ... it also has the power to enforce the settlement agreement,
49. Id. at 1371.
50. 343 F.2d 618 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 830 (1965).
51. Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368, 1371 (6th Cir.) (quoting Melnick v. Binenstock, 179 A.
77, 78 (Pa. 1935)), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976).
52. Aro Corp., 531 F.2d at 1371. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) states: "On motion and upon such terms as are just,
the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons: ...(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment."
53. Aro Corp., 531 F.2d at 1371.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1372.
56. Id.
57. 834 F.2d 1114 (lstCir. 1987).
58. Id. at 1117.
59. Id. at 1118.
60. Id. at 1124.
61. Id. at 1123.
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which is a contract, and to determine the amount owed, if any, by the guarantors to
the government."62 The court explained:
This power to enforce "has its basis in the policy favoring settlement of disputes and
the avoidance of costly and time-consuming litigation." In order to ensure that set-
tlement agreements are an effective form of dispute resolution, district courts who
enter judgment pursuant to such an agreement necessarily have the power to man-
date compliance with it.
63
Both the district court 64 and the court of appeals6" in Kokkonen relied on the
case of Wilkinson v. FBI 6 as authority for the inherent power to enforce settlement
agreements. Wilkinson and others brought suit against the FBI, alleging certain
constitutional and statutory claims that the FBI had wrongfully investigated and
disrupted their political activities. 61 Certain discovery stipulations were incorpo-
rated into a settlement agreement, and the court dismissed the claim.68 After the
FBI allegedly failed to comply with the terms of the agreement, the plaintiffs made
a Motion to Compel Further Production of Documents, which was denied.69 The
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's jurisdiction over the motion, due to the
fact that district courts possess "the inherent power to enforce settlement agree-
ments. "70
The leading case of many7 which reject the idea of inherent power over settle-
ment agreements is McCall-Bey v. Franzen. 72 In McCall-Bey, an inmate in an Illi-
nois state prison filed suit against corrections officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging that the officials had denied him his due process rights in prison discipli-
nary proceedings .1 3 The parties reached a settlement agreement in which the offi-
cials agreed to transfer the inmate to a work-release program outside of Chicago.74
Five days after the settlement agreement was reached, the judge dismissed the suit
62. Id. at 1127.
63. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Kukla v. National Distillers Prods. Co., 483 F.2d 619, 621 (6th Cir.
1973)).
64. See Brief on the Merits of Petitioner at 7, Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 114 S. Ct. 1673
(1994) (No. 93-263); Brief for Respondents at 5, Kokkonen (No. 93-263).
65. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 92-16628, 1993 WL 164884, at *1 (9th Cir. May
18, 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 341 (1993), and revd, 114 S. Ct. 1673 (1994).
66. 922 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990).
67. Id. at 556.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 557.
70. Id. Accord TNT Mktg., Inc. v. Agresti, 796 F.2d 276, 278 (9th Cir. 1986); Dacanay v. Mendoza, 573
F.2d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 1978).
71. See, e.g., Langley v. Jackson State Univ., 14 F.3d 1070, 1074 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 61
(1994); Sawka v. Healtheast, Inc., 989 F.2d 138, 141 (3d Cir. 1993); United Steel Workers v. Libby, McNeill &
Libby, Inc., 895 F.2d 421,423 (7th Cir. 1990); Adduono v. World Hockey Ass'n, 824 F2d 617, 622 (8th Cir.
1987); Hinsdale v. Farmers Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 823 F.2d 993, 995 (6th Cir. 1987); McCall-Bey v. Franzen,
777 F.2d 1178, 1185 (7th Cir. 1985); Londono v. City of Gainesville, 768 F.2d 1223, 1227 (1 1th Cir. 1985);
Village of Kaktovik v. Watt, 689 F.2d 222, 231 n.76 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Fairfax Countywide Citizens Ass'n v.
County of Fairfax, 571 F.2d 1299, 1303 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1047 (1978).
72. 777 F.2d 1178 (7th Cir. 1985).
73. Id. at 1181.
74. Id.
1995]
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in an order which stated: "Order cause dismissed pursuant to stipulation of the par-
ties.""5 Two months later the prisoner wrote the trial judge a letter, informing him
that he wanted to file a petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, on grounds that he
was being held under an unconstitutional disciplinary action.76 The judge treated
the letter as a petition to enforce the settlement agreement and ordered the officials
to perform their obligations.77 The Seventh Circuit vacated the order of the district
court, but upheld the finding of jurisdiction over the settlement agreement, though
not because of any inherent power.78 Judge Richard Posner, writing for the major-
ity, stated:
If indeed the case was dismissed under Rule 41 (a)(1)(ii), the plaintiff could not later
complain to the court that the dismissal had been premised on a settlement agree-
ment that the defendant had violated, and ask the court to order the defendant to
abide by the agreement. The court would not have jurisdiction over the dispute
merely by virtue of having had jurisdiction over the case that was settled. The viola-
tion of the settlement agreement would be a breach of contract remediable under
state but not federal law, and therefore only in state court since the parties are not of
diverse citizenship.
Judge Posner further explained that "[t]he claim of violation, like a claim in a dis-
pute over the assignment of a federal copyright, would be a good example of a
claim that does not arise under federal law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
§ 133 ."8
Judge Posner then stated that even if this letter was treated as a motion to vacate
under Rule 60(b)(6), there was no authority for enforcement of the settlement
agreement.81 "[T]he power to vacate is not the power to enforce a collateral agree-
ment."82 The court then expressly rejected the view of Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan
Co. :83
Speaking with great respect, we think the Sixth Circuit in Aro confused the power of
a district judge under Rule 60(b) to restore a previously dismissed case to his docket,
which he undoubtedly has, with his power to adjudicate a breach of contract, which
he may not have -and certainly does not have by virtue of Rule 60(b). Some breach
of contract actions are within federal jurisdiction, but a contract dispute between cit-
izens of the same state that arises under state rather than federal law is not, even
though the contract was made in settlement of a federal-question suit.
84
75. Id. at 1182.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1189.
79. Id. at 1185.
80. Id. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988) states: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
81. McCall-Bey v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1178, 1186 (7th Cir. 1985).
82. Id.
83. 531 F.2d 1368 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976).
84. McCll-Bey, 777 F.2d at 1186.
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Once the judge vacates the dismissal and restores the suit to the docket, he may
only adjudicate the issues in that suit, not issues of contract law "that he does not
have statutory authority to adjudicate.""5
The court then explained that if the parties want the district court to retain
enforcementjurisdiction over the settlement agreement, they should persuade him
to do so,86 stating that "we have expressed no doubt of the power of a districtjudge
to dismiss a lawsuit conditionally, retaining jurisdiction to effectuate [the] terms of
settlement agreed to by the parties."87 Judge Posner then stated that even though a
districtjudge should clearly retain jurisdiction over settlement agreements, "we do
not mean to suggest that to retain jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement a
judge must make the agreement part of the record of the case. Such a requirement
would discourage settlements .. *"88 The judge should "read the settlement
[agreement] and satisf[y] himself that specific enforcement of its terms would not
be contrary to public policy, [and] issue[ ] an order retaining jurisdiction to
enforce the settlement."89 The court then found such retention implicit in the order
of dismissal in this case, although tenuously, since the order of dismissal stated
that it was pursuant to the stipulation, and the stipulation stated that it was pursu-
ant to the settlement agreement, which gave the parties the right to petition the
court for enforcement of the agreement.9" Since "[n]o responsible judge would
agree to conditions of which he had no knowledge," and since thejudge behaved as
if he had retained jurisdiction, the court concluded that "the plaintiff has shown-
if barely - that the judge did retain jurisdiction of the case."9
The Sixth Circuit revisited its holding from Aro Corp. in the case of Hinsdale v.
Farmers National Bank & Trust Co. 92 In Hinsdale, the plaintiff brought a diversity
action for breach of trust.93 The parties ultimately reached a settlement agreement
with the assistance of a judge and signed a stipulation of dismissal with preju-
dice,94 even though the formal settlement agreement had not been drafted and
signed.9" The stipulation made reference to, but was not conditioned upon per-
formance of, the settlement agreement, nor did the court attempt to retainjurisdic-
tion over the agreement.9" The case was then dismissed with prejudice by court
order."7 One year later, the defendant notified the court that it would not execute
any settlement and asked the judge to reinstate the matter to the docket, due to
85. Id. at 1187.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1188.
88. Id. at 1189.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1188.
91. Id. at 1189.
92. 823 F.2d 993 (6th Cir. 1987).
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alleged proposals by Hinsdale which materially changed the stipulated settle-
ment.98 Both parties then filed motions for specific performance of the agreement,
and the judge, relying on his recollection of the agreement, ordered both parties to
specifically perform.99
The Sixth Circuit reversed, citing McCall-Bey for the proposition that the
"unconditional dismissal with prejudice terminated the district court's 'jurisdic-
tion except for the limited purpose of reopening and setting aside the judgment of
dismissal within the scope allowed by Rule 60(b)' of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.""1 ' The court then distinguished Aro Corp. from Hinsdale:
We held in Aro Corp. that, upon breach of a settlement agreement which terminated
the litigation pending before it, a district court may vacate the prior order of dis-
missal pursuant to Rule 60(b). We further held that once the proceedings are reo-
pened, the district court has inherent jurisdiction to enforce the settlement
agreement. We did not, however, hold that a district court hasjurisdiction to enforce
a settlement agreement without having vacated the prior unconditional order of dis-
missal with prejudice and without having reopened the proceedings.10 1
Thus, Hinsdale limited the holding of Aro Corp. to situations where a motion to
vacate under Rule 60(b) had been granted to a party alleging breach of the settle-
ment agreement.
Another leading case which refused to recognize the inherent power to enforce
settlement agreements is Fairfax Countywide Citizens Ass'n v. County of Faiifax. 2
In Fairfax, several associations and individuals sued the county alleging racial dis-
crimination in the paving of roads in black neighborhoods in violation of 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 103 Several months later settlement agreements were reached, and the
parties moved to dismiss the claims. 0 The motion was granted, but the order of
dismissal contained no reference to the settlement agreements.l"' After certain cit-
izens obtained a permanent injunction prohibiting the county from improving a
certain road, the county reviewed the obligations of the settlement agreements and
determined that they were contrary to state law. 
106
The plaintiffs then moved in the district court to vacate the dismissal, but
sought enforcement of the agreements rather than simply a reinstatement of the
lawsuit.10 7 The district court granted the motion under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b)(6) and entered an order to compel the county to perform its
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 995-96 (quoting McCall-Bey v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1178, 1190 (7th Cir. 1985)).
101. Id. at 996 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
102. 571 F.2d 1299 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1037 (1978).
103. County of Fairfax, 571 F.2d at 1300.
104. Id. at 1301.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1302.
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obligations under the settlement agreements."' The Fourth Circuit reversed, re-
jecting the Aro Corp. concept of inherent powers over settlement agreements.109
The court first noted its agreement with Aro Corp. that "repudiation of a settle-
ment agreement which had terminated litigation pending before it"11 empowers a
court "to vacate its prior dismissal order and restore the case to its docket." ' As to
enforcement of the settlement agreement once the case has been reopened, how-
ever, the court said: "We are of the opinion that the district court is not so empow-
ered unless the agreement had been approved and incorporated into an order of the
court, or. . .there exists some independent ground upon which to base federal
jurisdiction. '"112
The court rejected the idea of inherent power over settlement agreements for
several reasons. After noting that district courts are of limited rather than general
jurisdiction, the court said that the breach of the settlement agreement was a con-
tract claim, which did not arise" 'under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.' "113 As the settlement agreement was "a private contract entered
into after private negotiations between the parties[,] [b]oth its validity and the
interpretation of its terms [were] governed by Virginia law." 14 The court also sug-
gested that Aro Corp. had incorrectly relied on a state court decision for the propo-
sition that federal courts have inherent power to enforce settlement agreements.
Because "state courts, unlike federal courts, are courts of general jurisdiction,
state courts generally need not concern themselves with the source of their juris-
dictional authority over a dispute."" 6
As to the argument that derivative jurisdiction (ancillary and pendent) gives the
court jurisdiction over the settlement agreement, the court said that United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs117 and Dery v. Wyer 18 upheld jurisdiction "because the claim for
which no independentjurisdiction existed derived from the same nucleus of opera-
tive facts as the claim for which there did exist independent jurisdictional
grounds."119 Here, the "contract claim [was] factually and legally distinct from the
claim giving rise to the original litigation."12 As such, the aggrieved party had to
either take the contract claim to state court, or file a Rule 60(b)(6) motion to vacate
the prior dismissal and restore the original case to the court's docket.12'
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1303.
110. Id. at 1302-03.
111. Id. at 1303.
112. Id.
113.Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988)).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1304.
116. Id. at 1304 n. 14.
117. 383 U.S. 715 (1966) (superseded by statute).
118.265 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1959).
119. Fairfax Countywide Citizens Ass'n v. County of Fairfax, 571 F.2d 1299, 1305 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1037 (1978).
120. County of Firfax, 571 F.2d at 1305.
121.Id. at 1305-06.
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In Sawka v. Healtheast, Inc.,22 the Third Circuit rejected the notion of inherent
power over settlement agreements. The plaintiff in Sawka brought a Title VII
action in October of 1989.23 Her attorney negotiated a settlement, and the case
was dismissed with prejudice on February 21, 1991. 24 The plaintiff later decided
that the terms were not satisfactory, and her attorney notified the court on April
11, but made no motion to vacate the dismissal. 25 Because of a local rule requir-
ing such a motion be made within ninety days, the plaintiff's subsequent motion to
reinstate the case and vacate the settlement agreement in February of 1992 was
denied.126 However, Healtheast's cross-motion to enforce the settlement agree-
ment was granted, since it was uncontested.127 The Third Circuit reversed, hold-
ing that a court has no power to enforce a settlement agreement which is not part of
the record or incorporated into the order of the court, unless the court "has mani-
fested an intent to retain jurisdiction." '128
Similarly, in Langley v. Jackson State University,129 a professor brought a Title
VII action alleging discrimination by Jackson State University. 3' The parties
entered into a settlement agreement, which was not incorporated into the dis-
missal, nor was jurisdiction retained in the dismissal order. 31 The plaintiff
brought another Title VII action and simultaneously sought enforcement of the set-
tlement agreement, claiming that since the agreement arose under a Title VII
action, the court retained federal subject matter jurisdiction.132 The district court
enforced the settlement agreement with no discussion of jurisdiction.' 33 The Fifth
Circuit vacated the order and dismissed the suit to enforce the settlement agree-
ment, adopting the view of Fairfax and McCall-Bey that
once a court dismisses an action with prejudice because of a settlement agreement,
and the agreement is neither approved of nor incorporated by the court in its decree
or order and the court does not indicate any intention to retain jurisdiction, an action
to enforce the settlement agreement requires federal jurisdiction independent of the
action that was settled. 
134
Otherwise, the court noted, " '[i]f 20 years from now the plaintiff complains that
the defendants have violated a term of the settlement agreement, the judge would,
122. 989 F.2d 138 (3d Cir. 1993).





128. Id. at 141.
129. 14 F.3d 1070 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 61 (1994).
130. Langley, 14 F.3d at 1071.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1072 & n.2.
133. Id. & n.3.
134. Id. at 1074.
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in the plaintiffs view have jurisdiction to entertain the complaint-and this
regardless of whether the district judge intended to retain jurisdiction.' ,135
IV. THE INSTANT CASE
In Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America, 136 the Supreme Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit's holding that district courts have the "inherent" power
to enforce settlement agreements resulting from litigation pending before them,
unless the court retains jurisdiction in the order of dismissal, embodies the agree-
ment in the order, or there is an independent basis for federal jurisdiction. 
137 Writ-
ing for a unanimous Court, Justice Scalia began from the principle that federal
courts are of limited rather than general jurisdiction. 138 As such, a federal court's
powers are limited to those granted by the Constitution or by statute, 139 and may
"not be expanded by judicial decree."' 40 Since it is presumed that every cause of
action is outside of federal jurisdiction, 4' the party seeking federal jurisdiction
has the burden of overcoming that presumption.142
Before answering the question of whether Guardian overcame that presump-
tion, Justice Scalia distinguished the present case from a situation where a party
seeks to reopen a suit due to a breach of a settlement agreement by the other
party. 4 3 Noting that some courts of appeals have held that breach of a settlement
agreement is sufficient to allow a judgment to be vacated under Rule 60(b)(6),'
Justice Scalia stated:
It must be emphasized that what respondent seeks in this case is enforcement of the
settlement agreement, and not merely reopening of the dismissed suit by reason of
breach of the agreement .... Enforcement of the settlement agreement, ...
whether through award of damages or decree of specific performance, is more than
just a continuation or renewal of the dismissed suit, and hence requires its own basis
for jurisdiction. 1
45
The Court noted that the dismissal in this case was made pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 41 (a)(1)(ii), which allows a dismissal to be accomplished
'by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the
135. Id. (quoting McCall-Bey v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1178, 1187 (7th Cir. 1985)).
136. 114 S. Ct. 1673 (1994).
137. Id. at 1677.





143. Id. at 1675-76.
144. See, e.g., Keeling v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 937 F.2d 408, 410 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Baus, 834 F.2d 1114, 1124 (1st Cir. 1987); Hinsdale v. Farmers Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 823 F.2d 993, 996 (7th
Cir. 1985); Fairfax Countywide Citizens Ass'n v. County of Fairfax, 571 F.2d 1299, 1302-03 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1047 (1978); Am Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368, 1371 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 862 (1976); Chief Freight Lines v. Local Union 886, 514 F.2d 572, 577 (10th Cir. 1975); see also Van
Leeuwen v. Farm Credit Admin., 600 F. Supp. 1161, 1164 (D. Or. 1984).
145. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 114 S. Ct. 1673, 1675-76 (1994) (citations omitted).
1995l
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LA WREVIEW
action,' and causes that dismissal to be with prejudice if (as here) the stipulation so
specifies."146 As such, Justice Scalia stated: "Neither the Rule nor any provision of
law provides for jurisdiction of the court over disputes arising out of an agreement
that produces the stipulation. '
The Court then addressed Guardian's position that jurisdiction could be found
under the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction. Justice Scalia first rejected Guardian's
reliance on dicta from Julian v. Central Trust Co., "' which described an "ancillary
suit" as one
filed to continue a former litigation in the same court . . . to obtain and secure the
fruits, benefits and advantages of the proceedings and judgment in a former suit in
the same court by the same or additional parties. . . or to obtain any equitable relief
in regard to, or connected with, or growing out of, any judgment or proceeding at
law rendered in the same court.
149
Justice Scalia then stated:
The doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction can hardly be criticized for being overly
rigid or precise, but we think it does not stretch so far as that statement suggests. The
expansive language of Julian can be countered by (equally inaccurate) dicta in later
cases that provide an excessively limited description of the doctrine. "0
The Court then stated that there were generally two purposes for which the doc-
trine of ancillary jurisdiction had been used: "(1) to permit disposition by a single
court of claims that are, in varying respects and degrees, factually interdependent,
and (2) to enable a court to function successfully, that is, to manage its proceed-
ings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees." 5' As to the first purpose,
Justice Scalia noted that the facts underlying the breach of the settlement agree-
ment and those underlying the original suit for breach of the settlement agreement
have nothing in common.5 2
Guardian, however, relied on the second type of ancillary jurisdiction, the
"inherent power" of a court to "protect its proceedings and vindicate its author-
ity." '153 The Court noted that in Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A. 154
it had recognized the inherent power of a court to appoint counsel and investigate
and prosecute a violation of its order, but stated that "the only order here was that
the suit be dismissed, a disposition that is in no way flouted or imperiled by the
alleged breach of the settlement agreement.""' S As such, "the power asked for here
146. Id. at 1675 (quoting FED. R. Cv. P. 41(a)(l)(ii)).
147. Id.
148. 193 U.S. 93 (1904).
149. Kokkonen, 114 S. Ct. at 1676 (quoting Julian v. Central Trust Co., 193 U.S. 93, 113-14 (1904)).
150. Id.
151. Id. (citations omitted).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. 481 U.S. 787 (1987).
155. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 114 S. Ct. 1673, 1677 (1994).
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is quite remote from what courts require in order to perform their functions."156
Justice Scalia then elaborated:
The situation would be quite different if the parties' obligation to comply with the
terms of the settlement agreement had been made part of the order of dismissal -
either by separate provision (such as a provision "retaining jurisdiction" over the set-
tlement agreement) or by incorporating the terms of the settlement agreement in the
order. In that event, a breach of the agreement would be a violation of the order, and
ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the agreement would therefore exist.
157
Therefore, the Court concluded that where parties wish for a court to retain ju-
risdiction over settlement agreements, they may ask the court to do so. When dis-
missals are made under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 (a)(2), 5 8 the court may
dismiss "upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper."5 9 As such,
Justice Scalia stated that "the parties' compliance with the terms of the settlement
contract (or the court's 'retention ofjurisdiction' over the settlement contract) may,
in the court's discretion, be one of the terms set forth in the order." 6 Further-
more, the Court said that when dismissal is made, as in this case, by stipulation
pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(ii), which does not give the court authority to attach
terms or conditions to its dismissal, "the court is authorized to embody the settle-
ment contract in its dismissal order (or, what has the same effect, retain jurisdic-
tion over the settlement contract) if the parties agree." 6 Unless such actions are
taken, the Court stated, "enforcement of the settlement agreement is for state
courts, unless there is some independent basis for federal jurisdiction." '62
V. ANALYSIS
Although appearing to be a very simple and narrow decision, Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America'63 is a successful effort to deal with an
unnecessarily complicated and muddled area of the law -namely, "ancillary juris-
diction." This opinion appropriately places the "inherent powers" of federal courts
to control their processes and enforce their judgments under the general rubric of
"ancillary jurisdiction," or what is commonly known as the authority of a federal
court to hear factually related matters it would otherwise be without jurisdiction
to hear. Both doctrines have traditionally created tension between the limited
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) provides:
By Order of Court. Except as provided in paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an action shall not
be dismissed at the plaintiffs instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as
the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon the
defendant of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's
objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the court. Unless
otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice.




163. 114 S. Ct. 1673 (1994).
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jurisdiction of the federal courts and the reservation of nondelegated powers to the
states in the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution, and both are the result of the
reality that "when Congress has created a court of the United States and vested it
with jurisdiction over certain subject(s), the court at once becomes possessed of
judicial power commensurate to the jurisdiction conferred." 64
First, Kokkonen affirms many decisions from the courts of appeals which hold
that a voluntary dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(l)(ii)
16
divests a federal court of any jurisdiction over the case or controversy, except for
the purpose of reopening the action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b) 66 and setting aside the judgment.1 67 The lack of jurisdiction after a Rule 41
dismissal is constitutional in origin and should not (as indeed it was not in
Kokkonen) be taken lightly.
Justice Scalia prefaced the discussion in Kokkonen with the following state-
ment: "Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that
power authorized by Constitution and statute .. ."168 The judicial power of the
federal courts and the principle of limited jurisdiction are found in Article III, Sec-
tion 2 of the Constitution, which provides: "The judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority ... 69
As such, there is a presumption of a lack of jurisdiction in federal courts until it is
shown to be otherwise. 70 State courts, however, are courts of general jurisdiction,
and there is a presumption that they have jurisdiction unless a party demonstrates
otherwise.' 7 Because the power of the federal judiciary is limited by Article III,
any exercise of power beyond that granted is unconstitutional as a usurpation of
164. 1 MOORE, supra note 22, 0.60[6].
165. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(ii) provides that "an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff. . . by filing a
stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action. Unless otherwise stated . . ., the
dismissal is without prejudice .... A dismissal with prejudice is considered an adjudication on the merits, or
res judicata of any attempted litigation. See Lawrence v. Fuld, 32 F.R.D. 329, 331 (D. Md. 1963). But, a dis-
missal without prejudice leaves the action as if it were never filed. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496
U.S. 384, 396 (1990).
166. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) provides:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, sur-
prise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is
void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
167. See, e.g., Smith v. Phillips, 881 F.2d 902 (10th Cir. 1989); Barr Lab., Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 867 F.2d 743
(2d Cir. 1989); Hinsdale v. Farmers Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 823 F.2d 993 (6th Cir. 1987); Kuzma v. Bessemer
& L.E.R.R., 259 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1958).
168. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 114 S. Ct. 1673, 1675 (1994) (citations omitted) (citing
Willy v. Coastal Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1076 (1992); Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541
(1986)).
169. U.S. CONsT. art. III, §2, cl. 1.
170. Kokkonen, 114 S. Ct. at 1675 (citing Turner v. President of Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 11
(1799)).
171. WRIGHT, supra note 22, § 7, at 22.
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nondelegated authority; such usurpation is also a violation of the Tenth Amend-
ment, which states: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Consti-
tution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people." '172 Thus, any exercise of jurisdiction by the federal courts of cases
beyond their competency "would not be simply wrong but indeed an unconstitu-
tional invasion of the powers reserved to the states."173 Furthermore, since this
limitation on jurisdiction is constitutional in origin, the parties to an action cannot
waive jurisdictional defects.' 74 Indeed, a federal court
is obliged to notice want of jurisdiction on its own motion, and it may well happen
that the party who has invoked the jurisdiction of the federal court will be unhappy
with the result he achieves there and will challenge the jurisdiction at a late stage of
the proceedings after he has lost on the merits.
1 5
Jurisdiction over the action in Kokkonen was based on the diverse citizenship of
the parties. 176 The diversity statute requires that the parties be citizens of different
states, and that the amount in controversy be at least $50,000.177 Thus, even
though the parties were still diverse after dismissal of the case (for purposes of a
diversity suit for breach of the settlement agreement), the amount in controversy
did not meet the statutory minimum since there was no monetary damage
involved, only the alleged failure of Kokkonen to return files pursuant to the settle-
ment agreement. 178 As the Kokkonen Court correctly stated, absent some indepen-
dent statutory basis for federal jurisdiction (e.g., diversity), "[n]either the Rule
nor any provision of law provides for jurisdiction of the court over disputes arising
out of an agreement that produces the stipulation [for a Rule 41(a)(1)(ii) dis-
missal]."179
Thus, the respondent in Kokkonen relied on the doctrine of "ancillary jurisdic-
tion."18 Ancillary jurisdiction, what some commentators refer to as an "ill-defined
concept," '181 has been developed to allow federal courts to handle some matters
172. U.S. CONST. amend. X. See also Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 212 (1971) (Federal courts
should" 'scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which [a federal] statute has defined.'
(quoting Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934)).
173. WRIGHT, supra note 22, § 7, at 22.
174. Id. § 7, at23.
175. Id. (footnote omitted).
176. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 114 S. Ct. 1673, 1674 (1994).
177. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1988) states:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy ex-
ceeds the sum or value of $50,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between -
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional par-
ties; and
(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of
different States.
178. Kokkonen, 114 S. Ct. at 1674.
179. Id. at 1675.
180. Id.
181. WRIGHT, supra note 22, § 9, at 28.
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otherwise beyond their jurisdiction. Professor Charles Wright describes it this
way:
By this concept it is held that a district court acquires jurisdiction of a case or contro-
versy as an entirety, and may, as an incident to disposition of a matter properly before
it, possess jurisdiction to decide other matters raised by the case of which it could
not take cognizance were they independently presented.182
The doctrine, invoked originally in cases such as Freeman v. Howe,183 holds that
when federal jurisdiction " 'effectively controls the property or fund under dis-
pute, other claimants thereto should be allowed to intervene in order to protect
their interests, without regard to jurisdiction.' "184 The doctrine has also been held
to encompass compulsory counterclaims185 and impleader1 86 where there is not
only a common nucleus of operative fact, but also a "logical dependence" between
the original suit and the ancillary claim.187 In Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v.
Kroger,188 the Court said that "ancillary jurisdiction typically involves claims by a
defending party haled into court against his will, or by another person whose rights
might be irretrievably lost unless he could assert them in an ongoing action in a
federal court." '89
The doctrine developed as one of necessity,190 as one which "is founded upon
the right of a court which has obtained jurisdiction to decide every question which
occurs in the cause, and to protect its jurisdiction and enforce its judgment."191 Yet
many courts and commentators draw bright lines between the inherent powers of
courts to hear claims which are based on the same facts as the original claim, and
inherent powers to control their processes and enforce their judgments. 92 And,
many courts have failed to distinguish between the ancillary jurisdiction of federal
courts and the similar doctrine of "pendent jurisdiction," which allows plaintiffs in
federal question cases to bring original nonfederal claims when they are based on
the same facts as the federal claims which give the court jurisdiction.' 93 Indeed,
some writers have suggested that the distinction between the two doctrines is
unclear,'94 and the Supreme Court has declined to decide whether there is any
182. Id. (footnote omitted).
183. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860).
184. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 376 n. 18 (1978) (superseded by statute) (quoting
Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 11 (1976)).
185. See Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
186. See H.L. Peterson Co. v. Applewhite, 383 E2d 430 (5th Cir. 1967).
187. Kroger, 437 U.S. at 376.
188. 437 U.S. 365 (1978) (superseded by statute).
189. Id. at 376.
190. WRIGHT, supra note 22, § 9, at 28.
191. 2 PALMER, supra note 22, § 2.417.
192. See I MOORE, supra note 22, 0.60[6].
193. LARRY L. TEPLY & RALPH U. WHITTEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 98 (1991).
194.2 PALMER, supra note 22, § 2.417.
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"principled" difference between the two doctrines."'5 The confusion is readily
apparent.
In Kokkonen, even the Court acknowledges that "ancillary jurisdiction can
hardly be criticized for being overly rigid or precise."196 However, Justice Scalia
appears to have delineated the outer boundaries of the doctrine by dealing with the
two types of "inherent powers" as the "ancillary jurisdiction" of the federal courts,
or the doctrine "which recognizes federal courts' jurisdiction over some matters
(otherwise beyond their competence) that are incidental to other matters properly
before them."197 In other words, there are two "general" types of ancillary jurisdic-
tion defined by their purposes: "(1) to permit disposition by a single court of
claims that are, in varying respects and degrees, factually interdependent, and (2)
to enable a court to function successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings, vindi-
cate its authority, and effectuate its decrees. 198
Applying the first type of ancillary jurisdiction, the Court correctly states that
"the facts underlying [the] respondent's dismissed claim for breach of agency
agreement and those underlying its claim for breach of settlement agreement have
nothing to do with each other; it would neither be necessary nor even particularly
efficient that they be adjudicated together." 99 Indeed, one can hardly imagine a
case where the facts underlying the original claim are the same as those underlying
the breach of the settlement agreement, since any claim for breach of the settle-
ment agreement will always be based on the facts surrounding its execution. The
Court states that "[n]o case of ours asserts, nor do we think the concept of limited
federal jurisdiction permits us to assert, ancillary jurisdiction over any agreement
that has as part of its consideration the dismissal of a case before a federal
court."200
As to the second type of ancillary jurisdiction, or a "court's power to protect its
proceedings and vindicate its authority,""'1 Justice Scalia acknowledged the power
to prosecute a violation of a court's order.2"2 However, the Court noted that the
only order in this suit was the dismissal, which "is in no way flouted or imperiled
by the alleged breach of the settlement agreement."2"3 In order to invoke a court's
ancillary jurisdiction over violations of its orders,
the parties' obligation to comply with the terms of the settlement agreement [must
have] been made part of the order of dismissal -either by separate provision (such
as a provision "retaining jurisdiction" over the settlement agreement) or by
195. Aldingerv. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 13 (1976). See generally Note, A Closer Look at Pendent and Ancillary
Jurisdiction: Toward a Theory of Incidental Jurisdiction, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1935 (1982).
196. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 114 S. Ct. 1673, 1676 (1994).
197. Id.




202. Id. (citing Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987)).
203. Id.
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incorporating the terms of the settlement agreement in the order. In that event, a
breach of the agreement would be a violation of the order, and ancillary jurisdiction
to enforce the agreement would therefore exist.2"4
Since the order of dismissal did not contain the terms of the settlement agreement,
or even mention the agreement, no ancillary jurisdiction existed for breach of the
agreement as a violation of the court's order.20 Although this seems to be some-
what formalistic, in that the scope of federal jurisdiction can be determined by
whether an order of dismissal contains a statement that the court "retains jurisdic-
tion," it is absolutely necessary for maintaining the limited nature of federal juris-
diction. It is no less formalistic that federal jurisdiction over cases begins when a
complaint raising a "substantial federal issue" is filed.20 6
Applying this analysis to the practical matter of settling cases which have been
filed in federal court is simple. First, when the case is one in diversity, Kokkonen
has no bearing on the question of federal jurisdiction over a breach of the settle-
ment agreement unless the amount involved would be less than the statutory
amount of $50,000. When the amount in controversy is less than the requisite
$50,000 for a diversity suit, or when federal jurisdiction is not based on a question
of federal law, Kokkonen must be followed to ensure federal jurisdiction over any
breach of the agreement. When the parties remain diverse and the amount in con-
troversy for breach of the settlement agreement is at least $50,000, there is federal
diversity jurisdiction over such an action.
Next, the Court states in Kokkonen that when the dismissal is pursuant to Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2), a court may dismiss "at the plaintiffs
instance . upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper."207 As
such, the plaintiff must persuade the judge to include a statement "retaining juris-
diction" in his order of dismissal, or include a requirement that the parties comply
with the settlement contract. However, since most cases which settle would most
likely be dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(a)(l)(ii) by "filing a stipulation of dis-
missal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action,"208 Kokkonen allows a
court "to embody the settlement contract in its dismissal order (or, what has the
same effect, retain jurisdiction over the settlement contract) if the parties
agree, " "' even though Rule 41(a)(1)(ii) does not by its words allow such terms
and conditions. This is permissible since the parties agree to the inclusion of such
terms, which agreement is allowed in the stipulation under Rule 41(a)(1)(ii).
Since most parties to a settlement agreement will likely want to keep the terms
of the agreement confidential, they will likely seek to persuade the judge to include
a provision "retaining jurisdiction" over the settlement agreement, rather than
204. Id. at 1677.
205. Id.
206. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.4 (2d ed. 1993). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 3.
207. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2).
208. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(ii).
209. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 114 S. Ct. 1673, 1677 (1994).
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actually incorporating the terms of the agreement into the order, which would be
part of the public record. However, since Kokkonen does not appear to require the
judge to do so, it is a discretionary matter and parties are not assured of any coop-
eration on the part of district judges to retain such jurisdiction. Indeed, many
judges may feel that the settlement agreement, even though the result of a case
pending before them in federal court, is simply a matter of state contract law and
should be dealt with accordingly, especially in light of the increasing congestion in
the federal docket. Furthermore, given that many parties in federal court are there
only because of the availability of removal jurisdiction, it is very likely that the
plaintiff, whose original cause of action was removed to federal court, will not
assent to the retention of jurisdiction by the trial judge.
Kokkonen, however, left unanswered the question of a federal court's authority
to enforce settlement agreements after a party moves to vacate the judgment under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) for breach of the agreement. As stated by
Justice Scalia, the respondent in Kokkonen sought
enforcement of the settlement agreement, and not merely reopening of the dismissed
suit by reason of breach of the agreement that was the basis for dismissal .... En-
forcement of the settlement agreement . . . is more than just a continuation or re-
newal of the dismissed suit, and hence requires its own basis for jurisdiction.210
Thus, the holding of Kokkonen is limited to cases where the parties have not sought
to have the case reopened under Rule 60(b) and the judgment set aside.
However, it appears likely that the holding of Kokkonen will control cases where
the party does move to have the judgment vacated and the case reopened pursuant
to Rule 60(b)(6) for breach of the settlement agreement, in that a court may vacate
the judgment for breach of the settlement agreement, but may not enforce the
agreement absent an independent basis for federal jurisdiction. Rule 60(b)(6)
allows ajudgment to be vacated for "any other reason justifying relief from the op-
eration of the judgment. '21  This is only limited by the requirement that such
212action be appropriate to accomplish justice, or that there be "extraordinary cir-
cumstances. '  Many courts have held that breach of an agreement settling the
suit is sufficient to constitute "extraordinary circumstances" for purposes of Rule
210. Id. at 1675-76 (citations omitted).
211. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).
212. Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 615 (1949).
213. Keeling v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 937 F.2d 408, 410 (9th Cir. 1991). See generally
FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 206, § 12.6.
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60(b)(6) and allow a dismissal to be set aside for such breach,2"4 and some have
allowed settlement agreements to be enforced after the judgment is vacated.2"'
However, many courts have held that breach of a settlement agreement is suf-
ficient grounds to set aside ajudgment under Rule 60(b)(6) and restore the case to
the trial docket, but no additional affirmative relief, such as enforcement of the
settlement agreement, may be obtained.2" 6 This view seems consistent with the
language and spirit of the decision in Kokkonen. After emphasizing that this was
not a case where the party sought to have the judgment set aside under Rule
60(b)(6) for breach of the settlement agreement, the Court distinguished the relief
available after such a motion has been granted and the judgment set aside, and the
relief sought in Kokkonen: "Enforcement of the settlement agreement. . . is more
than just a continuation or renewal of the dismissed suit, and hence requires its own
basis for jurisdiction," implying that vacating the dismissal is merely a continua-
tion or renewal of the original action, as opposed to enforcement of the settlement
agreement, which "requires its own basis for jurisdiction."2 7 Thus, one can likely
have a dismissal vacated for breach of the settlement agreement, but enforcement
of such an agreement afterwards is unlikely.
VI. CONCLUSION
Judge Posner once made clear the absurdity which would result if an absolute
"inherent power" to enforce the terms of agreements settling cases pending in fed-
eral courts is recognized:
If 20 years from now the plaintiff complains that the defendants have violated a term
of the settlement agreement, the judge would, in the plaintiffs view, have jurisdic-
tion to entertain the complaint-and this regardless of whether the district judge
intended to retain jurisdiction. No statute confers such a jurisdiction and we hesitate
to use so formless a concept as inherent power to give the federal courts an indefinite
jurisdiction over disputes in which the federal interest may be nonexistent.2" 8
214. See, e.g., Keeling v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 937 F.2d 408, 410 (9th Cir. 1991); Hinsdale v.
Farmers Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 823 F2d 993, 996 (7th Cir. 1985); Fairfax Countywide Citizens Ass'n v.
County of Fairfax, 571 F.2d 1299, 1302-03 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1047 (1978); United States v.
Baus, 834 F.2d 1114, 1124 (1st Cir. 1976); Chief Freight Lines v. Local Union 886, 514 F.2d 572, 577 (10th
Cir. 1975); Van Leeuwen v. Farm Credit Admin., 600 F Supp. 1161, 1164 (D. Or. 1984). But see Sawka v.
Healtheast, Inc., 989 F.2d 138, 140 (3d Cir. 1993); Harman v. Pauley, 678 F2d 479, 481-82 (4th Cir. 1982).
See generally JAMEs, JR., supra note 23, § 12.15.
215. See, e.g., Joy Mfg. Co. v. National Mine Serv. Co., 810 F.2d 1127, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Aro Corp. v.
Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368, 1371 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976); see also Alyson M. Weiss,
Note, Federal Jurisdiction to Enforce a Settlement Agreement After Vacating a Dismissal Under Rule 60(b) (6), 10
CARDOZO L. REv. 2137 (1989) (advocating enforcement jurisdiction after Rule 60(b)(6) motion for vacating
judgment). Contra Darryl R. Marsch, Note, Postdismissal Enforcement of Settlement Agreements in Federal Court
and the Problem of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 9 REv. LITIG. 249 (1990).
216. See Adduono v. World Hockey Ass'n, 824 F2d 617, 620 (8th Cir. 1987); McCall-Bey v. Franzen, 777
F.2d 1178, 1186 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. $119,980, 680 F.2d 106, 107 (1 lth Cir. 1982). See generally
CHRISTOPHER J. MILLER, CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 37.11 (3d ed. rev. vol. 1991).
217. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 114 S. Ct. 1673, 1675-76 (1994) (emphasis added).
218. McCall-Bey, 777 F.2d at 1187.
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By a unanimous vote, the Kokkonen Court appropriately prevented such absurdity
and limited the ancillary jurisdiction of federal courts over enforcement of settle-
ment agreements. By respecting the separation of powers between state and fed-
eral courts, and recognizing that federal courts must of necessity have some
authority over matters otherwise outside their jurisdiction, the Court struck an
appropriate balance. For those seeking to ensure federal jurisdiction over agree-
ments settling cases pending in federal court, Kokkonen provides a simple answer:
Persuade the judge to retain jurisdiction over the settlement agreement in his order
with a provision "retaining jurisdiction," incorporate the terms of the agreement
into the order, or dismiss the case conditionally upon compliance with the terms of
the agreement. Otherwise, state court is the constitutionally-mandated forum.

